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fields involve inter-state treaty relationships and affect a state's right to regulate domestically.
In this way, these fields are both international and public.
I believe that we will see increasing cross-fertilization between these international public
law fields and investment treaty arbitration. Let me focus on trade as an example. While
some people characterize trade and investment as two sides of the same coin of international
economic law, these fields have historically been based on different treaties and populated
by different professionals. As a result, there has been less influence of case law and principles
from one field to the other than might have been expected.
However, there are signs that these fields might be converging. Investment provisions are
now being included in Free Trade Agreements, bringing trade and investment lawyers into
the same room. Some substantive ideas are moving from trade to investment, e.g., Canada's
Model BIT includes provisions that look similar to Article XX of GATT, and the U.S. Model
BIT includes provisions on financial services that look similar to those in GATS. And some
tribunals, chaired by arbitrators with significant trade law experience, have sought to define
concepts like necessity by reference to trade law jurisprudence (e.g., Continental Casualty).
CONCLUSION
Overall, one can expect a growing cleavage to develop between investment and commercial
arbitration as the bodies of law and profiles of participants diverge. But this is a dynamic
process, and we are likely to witness some countervailing-veiling forces led by two key
players.
First, to the extent that investors do not like the movement from a more private law
approach to a more public law orientation, we can expect them to use their power to
counter it by, for instance, moving their emphasis from treaties to contracts and by choosing
commercial arbitral rules (e.g., ICC or UNCITRAL) rather than specialized investment ones
(e.g., ICSID).
Second, advocates and arbitrators who can happily inhabit the world of investment treaty
and commercial arbitration will continue to emphasize the similarities between these fields,
but may also be happy to see some investment treaty cases repackaged as commercial ones,
as this plays to their comparative advantage.
THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
By Jan Paulsson*
Here and there, speakers and writers who address the topic of investment-treaty arbitration
have attempted to draw a line around what they evidently wish us to see as a new, distinct
process, different from other types of arbitration which they often refer to as commercial
arbitration. That is a reductionist term. I prefer "traditional arbitration" -or perhaps "pre-
1988" arbitration."
What is the nature of this line being proposed to us? The question merits a few moments
of reflection. Let us begin with a couple of trivial possibilities. First, this might be a librarian's
line, born of a sense of tidiness and a desire to subdivide the unmanageable flood of legal
developments in the international community. If that's what it is, why not? It is surely not
worth a debate, one way or another.
* Michael Klein Distinguished Chair, University of Miami School of Law; Co-Head, International Arbitration
and Public International Law Groups, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP.
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Alternatively, we might be talking about a territorial line drawn by jealous explorers, who
want to declare the discovery of new terra nullius just across their proposed border, thus
creating a special zone over which they can exercise dominion-perhaps to stake exclusive
claims as founders of a new scholarly sub-discipline. Again, why not? Proclaim your realm,
hoist your flag! Soon enough, we shall see if others will salute it.
But, to consider a third possibility, is this an analytical line? This is where I say, hold
your horses! Let us not too quickly accept the proposition that investment arbitration by its
supposedly unique nature is to be understood as the crucible in which the international
community regulates, or fails to regulate, something we are to understand as global public
administrative law. I am unconvinced. My quarrel is not with Benedict Kingsbury, who with
various colleagues has admirably explored a number of non-traditional international processes
by which public action may be tested. What concerns me is the fallacy of the suggestion
that this is always the function of investment-treaty arbitration, and never the function of
international arbitration as we knew it before 1988. Both of these propositions are false.
Every investment-treaty arbitration does not necessarily implicate important issues of
interest to society as a whole. And there were many pre-1988 arbitrations that did.
For those who doubt that last sentence, I need only produce a single Black Swan. I could
use Emmanuel Gaillard, but I haven't asked for his permission, so allow me to play the role
myself.
My first assignment, fresh out of law school in 1975, was to work on arbitrations arising
out of the Libyan nationalizations. Those disputes were decided under arbitration clauses
signed by the state. International law was explicitly applicable. My first client, a few years
later, was an investor called SPP which sought redress from the government of Egypt for
the cancellation of a vast tourism project which, so it was said, was too close to the pyramids
and therefore a threat to the cultural heritage of not only Egypt, but all mankind. That dispute
was submitted to ICC arbitration in Paris by reference to a contractual clause endorsed by
the Minister of Tourism.
For the entire decade of the 1980s, I spent more time on a series of Iranian disputes than
on any other matter. This had nothing to do with the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal. I acted for
the French government. In the early 1970s, the French Nuclear Energy Commission had
signed with the Iranian Nuclear Energy Commission an agreement by which Iran would be
allowed access as a partner in the giant EURODIF consortium, a multi-billion-dollar uranium
enrichment facility. After the fall of the Shah, the Ayatollah Khomeini decreed that the
Iranian nuclear industry should be dismantled as a matter of national (indeed, apparently
divine) policy. This, said the Iranian Commission, was a case of force majeure. That left
France faced with the unacceptable prospect of having to make up the massive Iranian
shortfall vis-a-vis its other European partners. The dispute resulted in a series of arbitrations
in France and Switzerland, which for years filled many pages of Francophone legal periodicals.
These arbitrations were conducted under the rules of the ICC, pursuant to contracts signed
by the relevant agencies of the two governments.
Given this little bevy of Black Swans, you will not be surprised that when it became
apparent in 1988 that investment arbitration was possible even in the absence of arbitration
clauses in contracts signed by the claimant investor,' my sense of discovery was limited to
the realization that a new jurisdictional foundation had been created-not that the merits of
1 SPP v. Egypt, Decision on Jurisdiction (Apr. 14, 1988), 3 ICSID Rep. 131.
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disputes involving public bodies or public policies would be affected. Broadly drafted arbitra-
tion clauses already mandated arbitrators to consider public laws, imperative rules, even jus
cogens. There was nothing new in this respect.
In other words, if the presence of public interest is the test of a type of arbitration that
must be segregated from private commercial arbitration, we must go back at least a century,
and redraw all of our maps.
There is no analytical line to be drawn around arbitration created by treaty. It is impossible
to resist the impression that the line being proposed is in fact a battle line, a meretricious
taxonomy intended to justify an agenda which ought to step out of the shadows. Perhaps
the core of all this is the idea that international disputes involving matters of public interest
should only be entrusted to bodies comprised of international civil servants or persons directly
appointed by states, or (as has been suggested) that all awards arising out of investment-
treaty arbitrations should be subject to an appellate body before which the only disputants
will be states-and any temporarily victorious private party would be left with the timorous
hope that its own foreign ministry will feel that it is in its government's interest to defend
the initial award.
By all means, let us debate this proposition, but let us be clear and honest about the
objectives being pursued.
In particular, let us understand that if we are talking about dismantling the current system
of investment arbitration-in the public interest-we should ask ourselves whether we are
considering reestablishing absolute sovereign immunity from jurisdiction. That means unwai-
vable immunity. That means undoing much more than the world after 1988: we would be
contemplating a backward leap of a good century, to the dismantling of the distinction
between jure imperii and jure gestionis, no less.
Let me conclude by accepting the premise that investment treaty arbitration has opened
its doors to a disparate variety of participants, and will continue to do so. If this leads to
the appearance of arbitrators versed in different disciplines and committed to different
priorities, how can we improve the prospects of collaboration and reduce counterproductive
rivalries?
Let us note, en passant, that it may be rather fatuous to stand on the sidelines and make
proclamations as to the proper qualification of investment arbitrators. The composition of
tribunals depends on what the parties have agreed or may yet agree, and each party will try
to affect the selection process with only one thing in mind-to improve the chances of
obtaining satisfaction in the case at hand, not to satisfy third parties.
Still, we should be able to agree on some best practices on the part of arbitrators as well
as appointing authorities.
For the former, persons who accept the invitation to resolve international disputes ought
to be aware of their contribution to the development of an important social institution. It is
not enough to take the stance that one is the simple servant of two arbitrants; the public
interest may impinge, and when it does, it is ignored at the risk of exposing the process to
criticism. Equally, an attitude of intelligent humility and open-mindedness is surely to be
extolled; international disputes frequently involve the uneasy coexistence of more than one
legal regime, and the resulting complexities are more readily conquered by collegial humility
than by dogmatism. In society, it is perhaps worse-more dangerous-to ignore others than
to disagree with them.
For the latter, it should be evident that the nomination of unqualified arbitrators may have,
and indeed does have, regrettable consequences in terms of the arbitrants' disaffection. It
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would be sheer foolishness for an institution to follow a blind quota system. If ten cases in
a row principally concern claims that require the valuation of a business venture, arbitrators
conversant with business microeconomics are indispensable in each case, and there is no
reason to give, say, specialists on multilateral regional trade arrangements "their turn."
Amateurism is a form of arbitrariness.
